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Concerns into the Progressive Trade
Agenda





1 Trade has been top of the political agenda for several years now, due to the election of
Donald Trump in the United States, NAFTA renegotiation, and British efforts to leave
the European Union, among other developments. These developments have helped to
(re)ignite controversies about how best to mobilize free trade agreements to produce
inclusive  and  equitable  outcomes.  Central  to  this  conversation  in  Canada  are
Indigenous peoples, who are directly affected by free trade agreements but have rarely
participated  in  their  negotiation.  A  significant  part  of  the  conversation  about
Indigenous  reconciliation  is  inclusion  in  the  economy.  Trade  negotiations  –  a
fundamental activity in a trading nation like Canada – is a gateway to this aspect of
reconciliation.
2 Soon after the Trudeau government assumed office in 2015, it indicated that it would
pursue a ‘progressive trade agenda’ (PTA).1 The objective of the PTA is to ensure that
the benefits and opportunities of trade are distributed more equitably and that trade is
not only free but fair and inclusive. While there has not been widespread opposition to
trade agreements in Canada, the Trudeau government’s adoption of the PTA strategy
recognizes  that  such  dissatisfaction  is  not  impossible.  A  backlash  against  trade  in
Canada  would  be  a  concern  given  the  Canadian  economy’s  reliance  on trade.  For
example,  in 2015,  total  exports of goods and services accounted for 31.5 percent of
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Canada’s GDP (Cross 2016, 4). Almost 17 percent of jobs in Canada are linked to exports
(Statistics Canada 2016).
3 The Trudeau government saw and understood the various manifestations of anti-trade
sentiment expressed in places like the United States and Europe in recent years. The
PTA is at least partially a response to this backlash. In the United States, Donald Trump
repeatedly claimed during his Presidential election cycle that trade agreements had
been unfair to American workers and had also exacerbated the US trade deficit. He has
received considerable support for this position. Shortly after assuming office, he vowed
to  pull  out  of  the  Trans-Pacific  Partnership  (TPP)  and  to  renegotiate  the  North
American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA).  He  did  both.  The  United  States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA) was signed in November 2018 and passed by US Congress
in early 2020. 
4 In Europe, hundreds of thousands of people poured into the streets in Vienna, Berlin,
and elsewhere through 2015 to protest the now-stalled United States-European Union
(EU)  Transatlantic  Trade  and  Investment  Partnership  (TTIP).  Europeans  expressed
concern about the challenge posed by some TTIP provisions to sovereign governments'
ability  to  regulate  in  the public  interest.  They also  worried that  TTIP would invite
opposition  to  European  food  safety  practices,  viewed  unfavorably  by  US  interests
seeking to compete in the EU market (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015). While Europeans
mostly feared the consequences of the agreement with the US, they soon recognized
that some of the provisions that concerned them in TTIP could also be found in the
Canada-EU  Comprehensive  Economic  and  Trade  Agreement  (CETA).  Protests  also
started to target CETA. 
5 In October 2016, opposition in some quarters seemed so strong that some worried that
CETA would not  pass  through the  various  EU legislative  hurdles.  In  particular,  the
Belgian region of Wallonia threatened to scuttle the deal until it received assurances
that CETA’s worst provisions could be attenuated in some way (Bollen, De Ville and
Gheyle 2020). CETA has been provisionally applied pending ratification by EU member
state governments, some of which still express skepticism about the agreement. For
example, in July 2019, France ratified CETA, but only after a contentious debate and by
a  close  vote  of  266-213.  These  various  developments  have  made leaders  across  the
world more attentive to the benefits and the costs of trade. 
6 The specifics of the progressive trade agenda were vague at first, but have come into
focus.  As  former  Minister  of  International  Trade,  François-Philippe  Champagne,
described it, “progressive trade means helping ensure that all segments of society can
take advantage of  the  opportunities  that  flow from trade and investment  –  with a
particular focus on women, Indigenous peoples, youth, and small and medium-sized
businesses….Progressive trade also means being open and transparent and maintaining
an ongoing dialogue with civil society and a broad range of stakeholders. It also means
ensuring that trade agreements include strong provisions in important areas such as
workers'  rights,  gender  equality,  and  environmental  protection,  and  reinforce  the
continued right of governments to regulate in the public interest. In short, it's about
efforts that help ensure international trade works for businesses and citizens alike.
That it works for people” (Champagne 2017). 
7 During  eleventh-hour  efforts  to  promote  passage  of  CETA,  former  Minister  of
International  Trade,  Chrystia  Freeland,  used  the  term  to  capture  revisions  to  the
agreement's  investor-state  dispute  settlement  (ISDS)  mechanism,  a  key  irritant  for
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CETA  opposition  in  Europe.  Donald  Trump’s  election  and  his  expression  of
dissatisfaction  with  NAFTA  provided  a  further  opportunity  for  the  Trudeau
government  to  clarify  the  PTA.  Two days  before  NAFTA renegotiations  were set  to
launch, Freeland, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, laid out her negotiating objectives in
a speech at the University of Ottawa. She said, “we can make NAFTA more progressive
first by bringing strong labor safeguards into the core of the agreement; second by
integrating enhanced environmental provisions to ensure no NAFTA country weakens
environmental protection to attract investment, for example, and that fully supports
efforts to address climate change; third by adding a new chapter on gender rights, in
keeping with our commitment to gender equality; fourth, in line with our commitment
to  improving  our  relationship  with  Indigenous  peoples,  by  adding  an  Indigenous
chapter;  and finally  by reforming the Investor-State  Dispute  Settlement  process,  to
ensure  that  governments  have  an  unassailable  right  to  regulate  in  the  public
interest”(Freeland 2017). 
8 More recently, former Minister of International Trade Diversification, Jim Carr, echoed
some of  these sentiments  noting,  for  example,  that,  “Canada strongly believes  that
inclusive trade is key to the prosperity and growth of our country.”2 Minister Carr also
participated  in  meetings  of  the  Inclusive  Trade  Action  Group  (ITAG),  made  up  of
Canada, New Zealand, and Chile. 
9 In all of these Ministers' official statements, there is a direct reference to Indigenous
concerns  as  a  key  component  of  the  PTA.  Indigenous  issues  received  particular
prominence in NAFTA renegotiations following Minister Freeland’s call to include an
Indigenous chapter in the trilateral agreement with the US and Mexico (Freeland 2017;
Schwartz  2020).  She  also  created an  advisory  body,  the  NAFTA Council,  appointing
Assembly of  First  Nations National Chief,  Perry Bellegarde,  alongside a dozen other
prominent Canadians representing key constituencies and stakeholders in the NAFTA
renegotiation. 
10 Indigenous concerns were on Freeland’s radar well before her August 2017 speech in
Ottawa. In September 2016, as Canada’s then-Minister of International Trade, she and
then-Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Carolyn Bennett, met with national
Indigenous leaders in Toronto. Freeland called the meeting, “the beginning of a really
important dialogue between the government of Canada and First Nations, Métis and
Inuit people about international trade.” She continued, “it’s a discussion that is long
overdue” (Nahwegahbow 2016, 1). More recently, former Minister Carr shone a light on
Indigenous  peoples’  relationship  to  trade,  saying  that,  “Indigenous  businesses  are
growing at a faster rate than other businesses in Canada and are more than twice as
likely  as  all  small  businesses  to  export. By  providing  new  tools  and  resources  for
Indigenous  entrepreneurs  to  compete  and  succeed  internationally,  our  trade
diversification strategy aims to reinforce this trend over the coming years.”3 Under
Carr’s leadership, the Government of Canada sponsored an Indigenous trade mission to
New Zealand in 2018 and to Texas and Oklahoma in 2019, among other such initiatives. 
11 The inclusion of Indigenous peoples fits not only with the goal of fairer trade outcomes.
It  also aligns with the Trudeau government's  purported commitment to Indigenous
reconciliation,  including  full  implementation  of  the  Truth  and  Reconciliation
Commission's 94 calls to action (Trudeau 2015). Indeed, the observation that Canada is a
trading  nation  grappling  with  Indigenous  reconciliation  captures  two  fundamental
aspects  of  contemporary  Canadian  reality  that  we  can  –  and  often  do  –  consider
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separately from one another. However, they intersect when we consider Indigenous
goals and concerns as they relate to the progressive trade agenda. The myriad ways
that  Indigenous  peoples  are  implicated  in  the  promotion  of  Canadian  prosperity
through trade necessitates an integration of Indigenous perspectives across the trade
policy-making process as a critical component of reconciliation.
12 Indigenous peoples  participate in international  trade as  market actors to enjoy the
benefits  of  trade.  At  the  same  time,  trade  rules  can  negatively  affect  Indigenous
interests related to the land and cultural practices, among other things. Decisions at
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in free trade agreement negotiations can
have an impact on their livelihood and treaty rights in significant ways, though rarely
with their consent. In some instances, Indigenous peoples have what trade scholars call
‘defensive interests’ (VanGrasstek 2013). Trade agreements threaten to impinge upon
cultural  practices  or  legal  rights,  just  to  name  two  possibilities.  The  focus  is on
preventing or mitigating any potential damage and working to safeguard treaty rights
and  ways  of  life  against  encroachment  by  trading  activity.  In  other  instances,
Indigenous  peoples  pursue  ‘offensive  interests,’  seeking  the  economic  benefits  and
opportunities that can derive from trade agreements (see, for example, Bélanger Baur
2019). Simultaneously achieving these various objectives can be challenging and there
is  no  strong  consensus  on  trade  priorities  and  preferences  across  Indigenous
communities (UN General Assembly 2015). 
13 Indigenous peoples have engaged in the debate about trade in various ways in the past,
however,  they  have  not  been  directly  involved  in  trade  agreement  negotiations
(Schwartz 2020). For example, they have commented on talks between the Canadian
and  American  governments  over  softwood  lumber.  The  Canadian  government  has
recently been engaged with its American counterpart, another installment in a series of
disputes  and bilateral  negotiations  that  have been ongoing for  decades.  US lumber
producers have long accused their Canadian competitors of an unfair advantage since
they typically lease their lands from (provincial) governments at rates more favorable
than those offered by private American landholders. Initiatives within NAFTA and the
WTO dispute systems have failed to resolve this disagreement. 
14 Canadian Indigenous groups have been active in the debate, pointing out that many
forested  locations  are  not  Crown  lands,  but  territories  subject  to  Aboriginal  title
(Kukucha 2005; Robertson 2015). In 2002, an alliance of five Indigenous nations from
British  Columbia  submitted  an  amicus  curiae brief  to  the  WTO,  arguing  that  the
Canadian lumber management system did indeed create an unfair advantage, not due
to low stumpage fees, as the American trading partner claimed, but because proceeds
owed to Indigenous peoples were not being paid out (Manuel and Schabus 2005). 
15 Indigenous peoples  expressed concerns  about  the original  NAFTA agreement (Gunn
2006) and were central to the WTO dispute on seal products. In 2009, Canada filed a case
against the European Union, protesting the EU prohibition on imports of seal products.
A distinction was eventually drawn between the commercial seal hunt and traditional
Indigenous hunts tied to subsistence and cultural practices (Fakhri and Redfern 2020;
Hossain 2011; Shaffer and Pabian 2015). 
16 Despite these select examples of previous Indigenous efforts to influence trade policy,
the Trudeau government's  declaration of  a  progressive trade agenda and its  stated
commitment to making the case for an Indigenous chapter in USMCA gave Indigenous
goals and concerns a new prominence and, arguably, created a critical opportunity. As
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Schwartz  (2017)  points  out,  "participation  of  Indigenous  peoples  in  negotiations  of
international  trade  agreements,  which have  the  potential  to  impact  their  rights,  is
consistent with international law requirements” (2017, 2). Current developments may
also have finally created a permissive political environment to enact these legal rights,
though recent outcomes have been uneven. 
17 The USMCA contains  a  specific  Indigenous provision,  though no dedicated chapter.
Article 32.5 provides a general exception for Indigenous Peoples Rights. It is much more
sweeping than any contained in agreements concluded by the US or Canada. It reads,
"Provided  that  such  measures  are  not  used  as  a  means  of  arbitrary  or  unjustified
discrimination against  persons of  the other  Parties  or  as  a  disguised restriction on
trade in goods,  services,  and investment,  this Agreement does not preclude a Party
from  adopting  or  maintaining  a  measure  it  deems  necessary  to  fulfill  its  legal
obligations to indigenous peoples." The article is accompanied by a footnote, which
says, "For greater certainty, for Canada, the legal obligations include those recognized
and  affirmed  by  section  35  of  the  Constitution  Act  1982  or  those  set  out  in  self-
government  agreements  between  a  central  or  regional  level  of  government  and
indigenous peoples." Chief Bellegarde called this provision “pivotal” (Bellegarde 2018)
because  it  should  ensure  that  trade  agreement  commitments  cannot  override  the
Canadian government’s legal and treaty commitments to Indigenous peoples. He went
on  to  call  USMCA  “ground-breaking  for  Indigenous  peoples  and  their  rights”
(Bellegarde 2018).
18 Several other provisions in the North American agreement are also noteworthy. For
example,  in  the  Preamble  to  USMCA,  the  Parties  resolve  to,  “RECOGNIZE  the
importance of increased engagement by indigenous peoples in trade and investment.”
Chapter  24  on  the  Environment  acknowledges  in  multiple  ways  the  important
relationship between Indigenous peoples and various aspects of  the natural  world.4
Some have noted that these provisions are in the main agreement text, rather than in a
side agreement, as was the case with NAFTA. Besides, Article 25.2(b) indicates that each
Party  shall,  “strengthen  its  collaboration  with  the  other  Parties  on  activities  to
promote  SMEs  owned  by  under-represented  groups,  including  women,  indigenous
peoples, youth and minorities, as well as start-ups, agricultural and rural SMEs, and
promote partnership among these SMEs and their participation in international trade.”
19 CETA  contains  no  special  provision  or  general  exception  for  Indigenous  rights.
However, Article 12.2.2 of CETA indicates that Chapter 12 on Domestic Regulation does
not apply to several sectors and activities, including aboriginal affairs. Schwartz draws
attention to this provision since it is included in the actual text of the agreement. It
allows  the  Government  of  Canada to  retain  or  introduce  domestic  regulations  that
benefit Indigenous service providers (Schwartz 2017, 13). Article 1(2)(a) of Annex 19-7
is part of the chapter on Government Procurement. It states that the chapter does not
apply to "any measure adopted or maintained concerning Aboriginal peoples, nor to
set-asides for aboriginal businesses; existing aboriginal or treaty rights of any of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 are
not affected by this Chapter." This CETA provision allows the Government of Canada to
award preferential contracts to Indigenous businesses.
20 While Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s government negotiated most of CETA’s text, the
Joint  Interpretative  Instrument,  which  emerged  after  Wallonia’s  late  efforts  to
influence CETA, was a product of the Trudeau government. It includes a reference to
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Indigenous peoples. Article 14 Preferences for Canada's Aboriginal Peoples states that
"In CETA Canada has included exceptions and carve-outs to ensure its ability to adopt
measures  that  preserve  rights  and  preferences  for  Aboriginal  peoples.  Canada  is
committed  to  active  engagement  with  Indigenous  partners  to  ensure  the  ongoing
implementation of CETA continues to reflect their interests."
21 The  Comprehensive  and  Progressive  Trans-Pacific  Partnership  (CPTPP),  which  was
salvaged by the eleven remaining signatories  to  TPP after  Donald Trump withdrew
from  the  United  States,  contains  some  provisions  relevant  to  Indigenous  peoples.
Chapter  20  on  the  Environment  contains  the  same  exclusion  in  the  definition  of
“environmental law” that we find in other FTAs to which Canada is a party, namely
that it does not include “any statute or regulation, or provision thereof, the primary
purpose  of  which  is  managing  the  subsistence  or  aboriginal  harvesting  of  natural
resources.” This provision shields Indigenous practices that might conflict with other
environmental objectives. 
22 In the chapter on Government Procurement, Annex 15-A, Schedule of Canada, Section G
Article 3(b) states that Canada's obligations under Chapter 15 shall not apply to "any
measure adopted or maintained for Aboriginal peoples, not to set-asides for aboriginal
businesses,  existing  aboriginal  or  treaty  rights  of  any  of  the  Aboriginal  peoples  of
Canada  protected  by  section  35  of  the  Constitution  Act,  1982  are  not  affected  by
Chapter 15 (Government Procurement)." This is a substantial provision (Panezi 2020).
Furthermore, the Preamble contains language that flags Indigenous rights. 
23 These developments, combined with a review of the academic literature, think tank
briefs, NGO materials, and testimony to Parliament by representatives of Indigenous
groups, among other resources, suggest at least five key issues that need our attention
to bring Indigenous goals and concerns into the progressive trade agenda in Canada. 
 
02. The Duty to Consult
24 A key issue that emerges frequently in discussions of Indigenous goals and concerns
about trade is  the importance of consulting Indigenous peoples and obtaining their
free,  prior,  and informed consent before any trade negotiations ensue.  The duty to
consult  is  grounded  both  in  international  law  and  in  the  moral  and  political
commitments that the Canadian government has made to reconciliation. 
25 There are three places where one might locate the duty to consult in law. First, the UN
Declaration  on the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples  (UNDRIP)  contains  provisions  that
establish the right of Indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making that affects
them (Schwartz 2017, 2). Several articles in the Declaration make relevant references
(Schwartz  2017,  3).  Second,  in  Canadian  law,  a  "procedural"  duty  to  consult  has
emerged from case law (Schwartz 2017, 4). Some point to Section 35 of the Constitution
to find the duty to consult, however, no clear duty is found there. Richardson (2017)
argues that "the duty to consult Indigenous peoples and, where appropriate, the duty
to accommodate their interests, is a Crown obligation… This duty stems from the honor
of the Crown, requiring it to act honorably in all dealings with Indigenous peoples"
(Richardson 2017, 3). There is debate about when, exactly, the duty is triggered, as well
as what counts as suitable accommodation when it is (Richardson 2017). 
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26 To date,  there  has  been no specific  challenge regarding Indigenous  consultation in
trade negotiations in Canada. However, closely related is the Hupacasath First Nation v.
Canada case,  which  pertains  to  the  bilateral  investment  treaty  signed  between  the
Government of Canada and China. Schwartz (2017, 4) points out that the Hupacasath
ruling on Indigenous participation turns on the practical and logistical challenges of
consultation rather than on any moral or legal obligation. Richardson suggests that
“the speculative nature of claims about the future consequences of FTAs [free trade
agreements],”  as  well  as  practical  obstacles,  may  make  extensive  consultation  of
Indigenous peoples challenging in trade agreements (Richardson 2017, 6). 
27 The third-place where one might locate a legal duty to consult is in modern treaties
between Indigenous peoples and the Crown (Schwartz 2017; Richardson 2017). These
treaties would not extend to all Indigenous peoples, but rather to some First Nations
peoples who have negotiated agreements with the Canadian government. 
28 None  of  the  three  legal  sources  establishes  a  clear  and  binding  duty  to  consult
Indigenous peoples where trade negotiations are concerned (Richardson 2017). While a
legal obligation would be important and powerful, it is not the only consideration. One
can also argue that there are moral and political reasons to consult Indigenous peoples
given the commitment by the current government to reconciliation. Indeed, in NAFTA
renegotiations, culminating in USMCA, the Trudeau government seemed to have taken
this  to  heart,  establishing  a  new  body.  In  early  August  2017,  the  Government
announced the creation of the NAFTA Council, a bi-partisan advisory body composed of
thirteen  prominent  Canadians  from  across  the  political  and  economic  spectrum  in
Canada. Notable for our purposes was the appointment of Perry Bellegarde, National
Chief of the Assembly of First Nations. Bellegarde commented that "throughout the
negotiations, First Nations have had a significant influence on the outcome of the deal,
and I had an opportunity to provide advice to Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, too"
(Bellegarde 2018).
29 While this is a step in the right direction, there are still  questions as to whether it
constituted adequate and meaningful consultation in USMCA. First, Bellegarde is the
National  Chief  of  the  Assembly  of  First  Nations.  Therefore,  while  he  may  be  well-
intentioned, he does not speak for the Métis or Inuit peoples of Canada. Second, the
extent to which Bellegarde received input from the broader First Nations leadership or
membership  is  unclear.  Furthermore,  it  is  worth  noting  that  no  similar  body  was
constituted for other recent trade agreement negotiations, though we can assume that
the Government of Canada is consulting with Indigenous peoples through other means,
including advisory working groups. 
30 In Canada,  processes exist  for stakeholders to register their support or concern for
trade agreements.  The Standing Committee  on International  Trade is  one example.
However, these opportunities have their limits. Typically, interested groups must get to
the  consultation  venue.  Interventions  are  five-minute  presentations  to  Committee,
followed  by  time-limited  questions.  A  written  submission  can  accompany  these
interventions, but both modes can be insufficient to communicate the range and depth
of Indigenous concerns. Besides, as the Canadian Council on Aboriginal Business notes
in its testimony, “it’s a very complicated technical subject to provide input on” (CCAB
2017). This affects both preparation and presentation of an intervention or submission. 
31 The  pace  of  USMCA  negotiating  rounds  also  made  meaningful  consultation  very
difficult. Eight rounds of talks were held, each lasting roughly five to ten days each. In
Bringing Indigenous Goals and Concerns into the Progressive Trade Agenda
Revue Interventions économiques, 65 | 2021
7
the  early  rounds,  less  than  three  weeks,  and  sometimes  considerably  less,  elapsed
between rounds.5 The time between rounds lengthened toward the end of negotiations,
but it was still a matter of weeks. As the IITIO representative put it in testimony before
the Parliamentary committee, the tight timelines do not allow for "full, frank, fair and
meaningful consultation with rights holders" (IITIO 2017b). 
32 Furthermore,  it  is  the  nature  of  trade  negotiations  that  a  range  of  stakeholders
communicate  their  goals  and desires  to  the government.  Then,  negotiators  enter  a
room where they must bargain with their counterparts, standing firm on some non-
negotiable items and conceding on others. Indigenous perspectives may be at odds with
those  of  other  domestic  stakeholders  or  they  may not  align  with  broader  goals  as
expressed by negotiating partners. For this reason, some Indigenous groups have asked
for a seat at the negotiating table (IITIO 2017a). IITIO also distinguishes "stakeholders"
and  "rights  holders"  (IITIO  2017b).  In  this  formulation,  sectors,  and  industries,  for
example,  are stakeholders in trade agreements,  while Indigenous peoples are rights
holders. As such, a higher level of consultation for the latter group would be warranted.
33 Ultimately, there must be a determination of what constitutes adequate consultation or
meaningful engagement where trade agreements are concerned. This will  affect the
legitimacy  of  trade  agreements,  as  well  as  the  broader  reconciliation  process,  for
Indigenous peoples in Canada. 
 
03. Traditional Knowledge 
34 Protections  for  Traditional  Knowledge  (TK)  in  trade  agreements  are  generally
inadequate. TK can be defined as “the summation of all knowledge, information, and
traditional  perspectives  relating  to  the  skills,  understandings,  expertise,  facts,
familiarities, justified beliefs, revelations, and observations that are owned, controlled,
created, preserved, and disseminated by a particular Indigenous nation” (AFN n.d.,4).
Article  31  of  the  UN  Declaration  on  the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples  (UNDRIP)
establishes that "Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop  their  cultural  heritage,  traditional  knowledge,  and  traditional  cultural
expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies, and cultures,
including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties
of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literature, designs, sports, and traditional games and
visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge,
and traditional cultural expressions” (UNDRIP 2007). 
35 Unlicensed use and misappropriation of TK have led not only to commercial losses for
Indigenous peoples, but also to spiritual losses as sacred beliefs, practices, traditions,
songs, and other aspects of cultural heritage intimately linked to Indigenous identity
are  used  without  respect for  or  permission  of  the  steward  community.  However,
finding adequate TK protections is elusive (Oguamanam 2004; Davis 2006; Dagne 2014;
Graber, Kuprecht and Lai 2012). Efforts to protect TK exist in domestic policy around
the world. In the last twenty years, international initiatives have been taken to protect
TK. 
36 One  prominent  example  is  the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organization  (WIPO).
Established  in  1970,  WIPO’s  core  tasks  include  "assisting  governments  and
Bringing Indigenous Goals and Concerns into the Progressive Trade Agenda
Revue Interventions économiques, 65 | 2021
8
organizations  to  develop  the  policies,  structures,  and  skills  needed  to  harness  the
potential of IP for economic development; working with the Member States to develop
international  intellectual  property  (IP)  law;  administering  treaties;  running  global
registration systems for trademarks, industrial designs and appellations of origin and a
filing system for patents; delivering dispute resolution services; and providing a forum
for informed debate and the exchange of expertise" (WIPO: An Overview). In the late
1990s,  WIPO  turned  its  attention  to  the  protection  of  traditional  knowledge  and
traditional cultural expression (TCE), and benefit-sharing for genetic resources. An ad
hoc committee was struck to study how the IP system might accommodate TK, TCE, and
genetic resources, and the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) was born. The IGC was
convened in 2001 for the first time and it has met, on average, twice-yearly since then.
Its activities have been accompanied by much data-gathering and analysis on the part
of the WIPO Secretariat,  including scores of fact-finding missions to indigenous and
traditional communities around the world. Its efforts continue. The 41st Session took
place in early 2020 and its mandate has been renewed through 2021. 
37 Several  scholars  have  illuminated  the  differences  between  Western  IP  law  and
Indigenous TK  as  distinct  knowledge  systems  (Anderson  2009;  Bowrey  2009,  2011;
Coombe and Aylwin 2014; Dutfield 2004; Munzer and Raustiala 2009; Zografos 2010). TK
protection is often broached as part of the IP conversation, as is  the case at WIPO.
However,  IP  frameworks  are  founded  on  different  philosophical  and  cosmological
commitments. Early WIPO fact-finding missions showed that "while many forms of TK
are or could be protected as IP, existing IP mechanisms are not able to fully protect all
forms  of  TK.  This  is  because  existing  IP  mechanisms  cannot  fully  respond  to  the
characteristics of certain forms of traditional knowledge, namely, their holistic nature,
collective  origination,  and  oral  transmission  and  preservation"  (WIPO  2001,  2016).
Similarly,  Drahos  (2011)  describes  distinctive  features  of  Indigenous  innovation
systems,  including  the  development  of  "systems  to  maintain  ecological  systems"
(Drahos 2011, 4) as opposed to mainstream notions of innovation "often conceptualized
in terms of firms developing new products and processes" (Drahos 2011, 3). As a result,
TK has not been adequately protected by international IP law.
38 WIPO acknowledges that the current IP system was created during the early period of
industrialization to reward and incentivize invention (WIPO 2016a, 1). That is not to say
that the current system is  irrelevant to Indigenous groups who,  in some instances,
choose  to  avail  themselves  of  a  patent  or  trademark  law,  industrial  design,  or
neighboring-rights  IP  protections  (Dagne  2014b,  45).  Yet  the  narrowly  commercial
notion  of  IP  enshrined  in  the  international  regime  is  not  wholly  compatible  with
Indigenous interests (Drahos and Frankel 2012; Frankel 2015a; 2015b). TK holders often
seek protections for indefinite rather than limited periods; for knowledge that may not
be classed as 'original' by IP standards; and for rights that are collectively rather than
individually  held.  For  these  reasons,  Geographical  Indications  (GI)  may  be  the  IP
category  that  most  resembles  TK.  "GIs  mainly  designate  products  originating  from
places, towns, regions or countries, instead of from specific private individuals" (Dagne
2014, 142). The relation to place and collectively-held rights creates synergies between
GIs and TK, but GIs  like feta cheese are ultimately still  commercial  products.  Thus,
there are limits to the protections that GIs can offer to Indigenous knowledge (Dagne
2014a,  2014b,  2015;  Gervais  2009,  2010;  Frankel  2011a;  Singhal  2008;  van Caenegem
2015), making IP and TK an uneasy fit. For these reasons, the tendency to fold TK into
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the intellectual property chapter of trade agreements is inadequate to accommodate
the distinctive features of Indigenous knowledge (Drahos and Frankel 2012;  Frankel
2015a; 2015b; Moody 2020).
39 In  a  very  interesting  recent  development,  provisions  intended  directly  to  protect
traditional knowledge and genetic resources as such (not necessarily as IP) have started
to appear in free trade agreements,  with a  marked increase after  2009 (Covarrubia
2011; Valdés and McCann 2014, 27; Morin and Gauquelin 2016). Some provisions are
more extensive than others.  Nonetheless,  this  trend is  noteworthy for two reasons.
First, it signals disappointment with multilateral processes at the WTO and WIPO and a
potentially fruitful new strategy to protect Indigenous interests (WIPO 2016). Second,
FTAs have repeatedly been portrayed as vehicles for developed countries to lock in
higher IP standards that would advantage corporate investors (Drahos 2003). TK and GR
provisions in free trade agreements turn this assumption on its head, although some
Indigenous groups remain skeptical that they will serve their interests. At a minimum,
FTAs  have  emerged  as  an  alternative  forum  where  Indigenous  objectives  can  be
pursued, if indeed Indigenous interests are driving the appearance of TK provisions in
free trade agreements. Further research is required to determine the motivations and
consequences of this phenomenon. 
 
04. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
40 Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) or investor-state arbitration (ISA) is a form of
dispute settlement that gives standing to companies or private investors to bring suit
against sovereign governments. Investors seek redress from governments when they
can show that their assets have been expropriated as a result of government action.
ISDS mandates a separate tribunal, outside regular courts, typically composed of three
appointed arbitrators. 
41 ISDS first appeared in the late 1950s at a time when governments were trying to signal
to foreign investors that their money would be safe in their country. These investors
were  reticent  for  a  variety  of  reasons  –  they  had  seen  the  same  governments
nationalize foreign assets or they worried that courts in the host country would not
give a fair hearing should a conflict arise between the investor and the government. In
many instances, governments struck special bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that
established ISDS to allay these fears. (In the Canadian context, these are often referred
to  as  Foreign  Investment  Protection  and  Promotion  Agreements  (FIPPAs)).  The
prospect of neutral tribunals would ostensibly mitigate risk for foreign investors and
increase the likelihood that they would invest.
42 ISDS  is  controversial  for  many  reasons  (Van  Harten  2008;  Van  Harten,  Kelsey  and
Schneiderman 2018). Provisions give rights to foreign investors that domestic investors
do not enjoy. There has been a notable increase in ISDS cases in recent years, causing
concern that the mechanism is being overused and, perhaps, abused (UNCTAD, 2014).
There is a worry that ISDS unnecessarily sidesteps legitimate courts. Arbitrators who
serve on tribunals have often represented the very companies bringing suit against
governments. Arbitrators are also typically paid by the hour, creating an incentive for
arbitration to take longer than the merits of a case might require. In many instances,
ISDS decisions cannot be appealed. ISDS cases can be very expensive to defend. Some
worry that governments faced with the threat of an ISDS suit may opt not to implement
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the  offending  regulation,  even  if  it  is  in  the  public  interest  to  do  so,  creating  a
prospective  “regulatory  chill.”  It  is  in  answer  to  this  concern  that  the  Trudeau
government’s  progressive  trade  agenda  commits  to  the  government’s  “right  to
regulate.” 
43 Indigenous  peoples  have  specific  concerns  about  ISDS.  They  were  perhaps  most
eloquently expressed in a 2015 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz. "The Special Rapporteur's research reveals
an alarming number of cases in the mining, oil and gas, hydroelectric and agribusiness
sectors  whereby  foreign  investment  projects  have  resulted  in  serious  violations  of
indigenous peoples’ land, self-governance and cultural rights” (Tauli-Corpuz 2016, 7).
She continues, “Inadequate respect and protections for indigenous peoples’ land and
free, prior and informed consent rights when granting rights to investors over their
territories  are  the root  causes  for  subsequent  and broader violations of  indigenous
peoples’ rights” (Tauli-Corpuz 2016, 8). 
44 While governments continue to negotiate BITs, ISDS provisions have also been common
in trade agreements. The North American Free Trade Agreement (1994) was one of the
first to contain such a provision. NAFTA's Chapter 11 spawned several prominent and
controversial  cases.  Subsequent  FTAs,  including  the  recent  Comprehensive  and
Progressive  Trans-Pacific  Partnership  (CPTPP)  and  Canada-EU  Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), contain ISDS provisions, though this trend may
be slowing, at least in Europe. Indigenous peoples are not the only ones to express
concern  about  ISDS.  CETA  negotiations  were  stalled  over  this  issue.  Wallonia's
eleventh-hour  opposition  to  Belgium's  participation  in  CETA  was  at  least  partly
inspired by concern over ISDS. Both the EU and the Canadian government were moved
in this instance to shift focus to the possibility of creating an international investment
court, which includes proposals for greater transparency, appellate proceedings, and
the  appointment  of  independent  and impartial  arbitrators  to  allay  the  concerns  of
opponents to ISDS. (Diependaele, De Ville, and Sterckx 2019).
45 This  impulse  to  move ISDS out  of  European trade  agreements  was  reinforced by  a
recent decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which considered the
EU's trade agreement with Singapore. It ruled that ISDS is not within the EU's exclusive
competence, even though the Lisbon Treaty sought to transfer jurisdiction over trade
negotiations to the EU level (on EU trade, see Bollen, De Ville and Gheyle 2020; Garcia
2020).  As  a  result,  commentators have  predicted  that  future  European  trade
agreements will not include ISDS provisions. 
46 ISDS has also recently been controversial in the American context. USMCA will limit
ISDS between Canada and the United States. Despite these strides, it may be too early to
speak of the phenomenon of ISDS provisions in trade agreements in the past tense. The
investment  court  system  that  the  EU  and  Canada  support  is  still  unfolding.
Furthermore, ISDS provisions still exist in other trade agreements, like CPTPP. In their
testimony  to  Parliament  on  the  Trans-Pacific  Partnership,  the  Union  of  British
Columbia Indian Chiefs expressed their concerns about it, saying that, "ISDS provides a
loophole  to  ignore  Indigenous  rights  and  title"  (UBCIC  2017).  Therefore,  as  the
conversation  about  the  future  of  ISDS  continues,  it  will  be  important  to  include
Indigenous peoples’ specific concerns. 
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05. Inter-Indigenous Trade
47 A key component of the trade discussion for Indigenous peoples is the possibility of
conducting trade between and among Indigenous groups across North America and the
world (EagleWoman 2020). Historically, before colonization, Indigenous groups traded
extensively  with  one  another.  For  example,  Jobin’s  (2013)  study  of  the  Plains  Cree
shows highly developed trading relations, as well as a sophisticated network of trails
and trading routes to support them. Jobin argues that Cree trading practices were a
critical manifestation of their status as a self-determining people (Jobin 2013, 603). “If,
as the research evidence proves, international trade occurred, then it stands to reason
that  Indigenous  rights  in  Canada should  include  the  redeployment  of  international
alliances including Indigenous international trade agreements” (Jobin 2013, 635). 
48 The National  Aboriginal  Economic  Development  Board asserts  something similar  in
their testimony before the Standing Committee on International Trade. “Traditionally,
our people had free and open borders. Trade between nations that today fall on both
sides of the US and Canadian borders was unencumbered…” The NAEDB noted in their
testimony  that  opportunities  for  inter-tribal  trade  across  the  Canada-US  border
“depends on the border crossing.” It is easier in some locations than others. Much of
this discussion relates to the acknowledgment of the Jay Treaty. Officially known as the
Treaty of  Amity,  Commerce,  and Navigation,  signed by the United States and Great
Britain in 1794, the Jay Treaty seems to establish border-crossing rights for Indigenous
peoples in Article III by specifically calling for “the Indians dwelling on either side of
said Boundary Line freely to pass and re-pass by Land, or Inland Navigation, into the
respective Territories and Countries of the Two Parties on the Continent of America.”
However, a Standing Committee of the Canadian Senate argued that “for two reasons,
the  Jay  Treaty  has  no  practical  application in  Canada today”  (Senate  2016,  8).  The
Report continues:  “First,  the Jay Treaty was abrogated by the War of 1812 between
Great Britain and the United States. Second, the Treaty has not been implemented or
sanctioned by legislation in Canada” (Senate 2016, 8). 
49 While IITIO representatives acknowledge that the Jay Treaty “has no force or effect in
Canada,” the spirit of the Treaty can be upheld and legislation passed to give it effect
(IITIO  2017b).  Doing  so  would  greatly  ease  cross-border  relations  for  Indigenous
peoples living near the US-Canada border. Canadian Indigenous groups, therefore, have
called for a process to allow free movement of goods and people to facilitate inter-
Indigenous trade, a process that will likely not find its clearest manifestation in trade
agreements.  Nonetheless,  discussions  of  cross-border  trade  in  the  context  of  trade
agreement negotiations have shed new light on this important issue. 
 
06. The Limits of Trade Agreements
50 Trade policy and trade agreement negotiations should comprise one component of a
larger  policy  strategy  to  promote  Indigenous  economic  development.  Integrating
Indigenous  goals  and  concerns  into  the  progressive  trade  agenda  must  include  a
discussion of the opportunities that exist across the range of trade agreements that
Canada  may  negotiate  with  various  partners.  There  should  also  be  a  focus  on  the
broader  aspects  of  trade  policy  beyond  trade  agreement  negotiations,  as  well  as
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complementary domestic policies, which might include Indigenous export promotion
assistance and reforms to regulations governing business practices on and off reserve.
51 We have seen some recent successes in the North American context about Indigenous
issues  and  trade,  notably  the  general  exception  for  Indigenous  Rights  in  USMCA.
Nonetheless, many questions remain. First, how will Indigenous perspectives fit into
trade negotiations with other partners? The Government of Canada has indicated that
it  is  exploring  possible  agreements  with  China,  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian
Nations (ASEAN), and the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Peru), among
others. Wolfe (2017) suggests that China would be unreceptive to the progressive trade
agenda. “That’s because this agreement could well be a template for its negotiations
with other OECD countries –  meaning that what China agrees to with Canada,  may
become its default negotiating position expected by other countries” (Wolfe 2017, 2).
Will the Trudeau government remain committed to a progressive trade agenda that
includes Indigenous perspectives in these prospective agreements? Will a subsequent
Canadian  government  preserve  this  commitment?  Does  the  identity  of  the  trading
partner affect possible outcomes for Indigenous peoples in trade negotiations? 
52 Second, how can trade agreements best reflect or incorporate Indigenous interests?
Previous Canadian trade agreements have included carve-outs (Schwartz 2017, 12). The
CETA agreement is one instance of this given the government procurement provisions
that privilege Indigenous interests. The NAFTA renegotiation considered an Indigenous
chapter.  What  do  such  strategies  achieve  or  exclude?  What  would  an  Indigenous
chapter contain (Schwartz 2020)? For example,  a chapter can include language that
reaffirms the Canadian government’s commitment as a signatory of the UN Declaration
on the  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples  (UNDRIP).  Is  this  desirable?  Would  indigenous
concerns be confined to such a chapter? Presumably, Indigenous peoples have concerns
that cut across other chapters. How would that be handled? Which approach is best-
suited to Indigenous goals as they pertain to trade? 
53 Third, which other aspects of trade policy, in addition to trade agreement negotiations,
should draw our attention? On their own, trade agreement provisions are not enough
to provide the support for economic development that Indigenous peoples in Canada
seek. Domestic flanking policies are also required, including reform to the Indian Act,
programs to promote Indigenous economic development, and incentives for Indigenous
businesses to avail themselves of government export promotion services. How can this
best be encouraged and through what means? 
 
07. Conclusion
54 The election of Donald Trump and the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement  (NAFTA)  brought  trade  to  the  top  of  the  political  agenda  and  ignited
controversies about how best to mobilize free trade agreements to produce inclusive
and equitable outcomes. Central to this conversation in Canada are Indigenous peoples,
who are directly affected by FTAs but have rarely participated in their negotiation. This
paper flags  key issues in this  conversation to deepen our understanding of  how to
integrate  Indigenous  concerns  into  the  progressive  trade  agenda.  In  particular,
attention to the duty to consult Indigenous peoples before and during trade agreement
negotiations,  to  the  special  protections  that  are  required  to  safeguard  Traditional
Knowledge,  to  the  significant  threat  posed  to  Indigenous  rights  and  practices  by
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investor-state dispute settlement, and to the prospects for inter-Indigenous trade is
essential.  A  critical  part  of  the  conversation about  Indigenous  reconciliation is  full
inclusion in the economy.  Trade negotiations –  a  fundamental  activity in a  trading
nation like Canada – is a gateway to this dimension of reconciliation. 
This research was supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Knowledge Synthesis Grant, 2017-2018.
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NOTES
1. We have more recently seen a terminological shift toward "inclusive trade," but there are





4. For  example,  in  addition  to  provisions  on  marine  wildlife  and  forest  management  that
reference  Indigenous  peoples,  Article  24.2(4)  says  that  "The  Parties  recognize  that  the
environment  plays  an  important  role  in  the  economic,  social,  and  cultural  well-being  of
indigenous peoples and local communities, and acknowledge the importance of engaging with
these groups in the long-term conservation of the environment." Article 24.15(3), which deals
with  Trade  and  Biodiversity,  says,  "The  Parties  recognize  the  importance  of  respecting,
preserving,  and  maintaining  knowledge  and  practices  of  indigenous  peoples  and  local
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communities embodying traditional lifestyles that contribute to the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity."
5. Round 1 Aug 16-20,  2017 (Washington);  Round 2 Sept  1-5,  2017
(Mexico City); Round 3 Sept 23-27, 2017 (Ottawa); Round 4 Oct 11-17,
2017 (Washington).
ABSTRACTS
A key element of the progressive trade agenda is attention to the concerns of Indigenous peoples.
To ensure that Indigenous peoples' interests are addressed in free trade agreement negotiations
and as part of trade policy more generally, at least four aspects must be priorities. These are the
duty to consult, the distinct features of traditional knowledge, investor-state dispute settlement,
and inter-Indigenous trade. Successfully integrating these topics into the trade agenda would
constitute a serious first step toward exploring the intersection of reconciliation and economic
development in Canada and toward achieving the promise of the progressive trade agenda. 
L'attention portée aux préoccupations des peuples autochtones est un élément clé du programme
commercial progressiste canadien. Mais pour que leurs intérêts soient réellement pris en compte
dans  les  négociations  commerciales  et,  plus  généralement,  dans  le  cadre  de  la  politique
commerciale,  au moins quatre éléments doivent figurer dans les priorités :  1)  l’obligation de
consulter les peuples autochtones ;  2)  la  reconnaissance des savoirs traditionnels et  de leurs
caractéristiques distinctes ; 3) le règlement des différends investisseur-État ; et 4) le commerce
entre  des  peuples  autochtones. L'intégration  réussie  de  ces  éléments  dans  le  programme
commercial  constituerait  une  première  étape  cruciale  si  l’on  veut  avancer  réconciliation  et
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